From 8767e2b33bf6e6297a61dffa188fe499e5712e4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leah Rowe Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 23:17:58 +0000 Subject: rename GRUB_hardening.html to grub_hardening.html --- docs/gnulinux/GRUB_hardening.html | 259 -------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 259 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/gnulinux/GRUB_hardening.html (limited to 'docs/gnulinux') diff --git a/docs/gnulinux/GRUB_hardening.html b/docs/gnulinux/GRUB_hardening.html deleted file mode 100644 index b2662932..00000000 --- a/docs/gnulinux/GRUB_hardening.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,259 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - - - - GRUB secure boot with PGP - - - -
-

- GRUB secure boot with PGP -

- -

- This tutorial assumes you have a libreboot image (rom) that you wish to modify, - to which we shall henceforth refer to as "my.rom". - This tutorial modifies grubtest.cfg, this means signing and password protection - will work after switching to it in the main boot menu and bricking due to - incorrect configuration will be impossible. - After you are satisfied with the setup, you should transfer the new settings - to grub.cfg to make your machine actually secure. -

- -

- First extract the old grubtest.cfg and remove it from the libreboot image: -

-cbfstool my.rom extract -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg
-cbfstool my.rom remove -n grubtest.cfg
-
-

-

- Helpful links: -

-

-
-
-

- GRUB Password -

-

- The security of this setup depends on a good GRUB password as PGP signature - checking can be disabled through the interactive console: -

-
set check_signatures=no
-

- This is good in that it allows you to occasionally boot unsigned liveCDs and such. - You may think of supplying signatures on an usb key, but the signature - checking code currently looks for </path/to/filename>.sig when verifying - </path/to/filename> and as such it is not possible to supply signatures - in an alternate location. -

-

- Note that this is not your LUKS password, but it's a password that you have to - enter in order to use "restricted" functionality (such as console). This - protects your system from an attacker simply booting a live USB and re-flashing - your firmware. - This should be different than your LUKS passphrase and user password. -

- -

- The GRUB password can be entered in two ways: -

- We will (obviously) use the later. Generating the PBKDF2 derived key is done - using the grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2 utility. You can get it by installing - GRUB version 2. Generate a key by giving it a password: -

-
grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2
-

- Its output will be a string of the following form: - grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.HEXDIGITS.MOREHEXDIGITS -

-

- Now open my.grubtest.cfg and put the following before the menu entries (prefered - above the functions and after other directives). Of course use the pbdkf string - that you had generated yourself: -

-
-set superusers="root"
-password_pbkdf2 root grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.711F186347156BC105CD83A2ED7AF1EB971AA2B1EB2640172F34B0DEFFC97E654AF48E5F0C3B7622502B76458DA494270CC0EA6504411D676E6752FD1651E749.8DD11178EB8D1F633308FD8FCC64D0B243F949B9B99CCEADE2ECA11657A757D22025986B0FA116F1D5191E0A22677674C994EDBFADE62240E9D161688266A711
-

- Obviously, replace it with the correct hash that you actually got for the password - that you entered. Meaning, not the hash that you see above! -

-

- As enabling password protection as above means that you have to input it on - every single boot, we will make one menu entry work without it. Remember that - we will have PGP signing active, thus a potential attacker will not be able - to boot an arbitrary operating system. We do this by adding option - --unrestricted to a menuentry definition: -

-
menuentry 'Load Operating System (incl. fully encrypted disks)  [o]' --hotkey='o' --unrestricted {
-...
-

- Another good thing to do, if we chose to load signed on-disk GRUB configurations, - is to remove (or comment out) unset superusers in function try_user_config: -

-
-function try_user_config {
-   set root="${1}"
-   for dir in boot grub grub2 boot/grub boot/grub2; do
-      for name in '' autoboot_ libreboot_ coreboot_; do
-         if [ -f /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg ]; then
-            #unset superusers
-            configfile /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg
-         fi
-      done
-   done
-}
-

- Why? We allowed booting normally without entering a password above. - When we unset superusers and then load a signed GRUB configuration file, - we can easily use the command line as password protection will be completely - disabled. Disabling signature checking and booting whatever an attacker wants - is then just a few GRUB commands away. -

- -

- As far as basic password setup is concerned we are done and we can now move on to signing. -

-
-
-

- PGP keys -

-

- First generate a PGP keypair to use for signing. Option RSA (sign only) is ok. -

-

- Warning: GRUB does not read ASCII armored keys. - When attempting to trust ... a key filename it will print error: bad signature -

-
-mkdir --mode 0700 keys
-gpg --homedir keys --gen-key
-gpg --homedir keys --export-secret-keys --armor > boot.secret.key # backup
-gpg --homedir keys --export > boot.key
- -

- Now that we have a key, we can sign some files with it. We have to sign: -

- - Suppose that we have a pair of my.kernel and my.initramfs - and an on-disk libreboot_grub.cfg. We sign them by issuing the - following commands: -

-
-gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.initramfs
-gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.kernel
-gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign libreboot_grub.cfg
-gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.grubtest.cfg
-
-

- Of course some further modifications to my.grubtest.cfg will be required. - We have to trust the key and enable signature enforcement - (put this before menu entries): -

-
-trust (cbfsdisk)/boot.key
-set check_signatures=enforce
-
-

- What remains now is to include the modifications into the image (rom): -

-
-cbfstool my.rom add -n boot.key -f boot.key -t raw
-cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg -t raw
-cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg.sig -f my.grubtest.cfg.sig -t raw
-
-

- ... and flashing it. -

-
- -
- -

- Copyright © 2017 Fedja Beader <fedja@protonmail.ch>
- Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document - under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license - or any later version published by Creative Commons; - - A copy of the license can be found at ../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt -

- -

- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode -

- -

- UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE - EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS - AND AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF - ANY KIND CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, - IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, - WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, - ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT - KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES ARE NOT - ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. -

-

- TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE - TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, - NEGLIGENCE) OR OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, - INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, - COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR - USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN - ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR - DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR - IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. -

-

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-
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