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author | Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io> | 2017-03-17 22:24:25 -0700 |
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committer | Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io> | 2017-03-17 22:24:25 -0700 |
commit | dbc480fb28a694ad5a587be025eabfded7c7784b (patch) | |
tree | 16b4251dcbdede274781f7bb8b1f23570853f3bb /docs/hardware/x60_security.md | |
parent | 85ec6862e8af0747420ca15fef7100edb5885302 (diff) | |
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diff --git a/docs/hardware/x60_security.md b/docs/hardware/x60_security.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82cd2401 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/hardware/x60_security.md @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +<div class="section"> + +Security on the ThinkPad X60 +============================ + +Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This +tutorial is **incomplete** at the time of writing. + +[Back to previous index](./) + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Table of Contents +================= + +- [Hardware Requirements](#hardware_requirements) +- [Software Requirements](#software_requirements) +- [The procedure](#procedure) + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Hardware requirements {#hardware_requirements} +===================== + +- An X60 +- screwdriver +- (in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel) + +Software requirements {#software_requirements} +===================== + +- none (at least in the scope of the article as-is) +- You probably want to encrypt your GNU+Linux install using LUKS + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Rationale +========= + +Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is +important aswell. + +This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct +memory access that could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be +used to remotely command the system (or leak data). All of this is +purely theoretical for the time being. + +Disassembly {#procedure} +=========== + +Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):\ +The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3 +locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):\ +![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth0.jpg)\ +Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth +module is on the left (easily removable):\ +![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth.jpg)\ + +If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):\ +Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard0.jpg)\ +SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard1.jpg)\ +Replacement: USB dongle. + +Now get into the motherboard. + +Remove those screws:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0000.jpg) + +Push the keyboard forward (carefully):\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001.jpg) + +Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0002.jpg) + +Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and +pry up the rest of the chassis:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0003.jpg) + +You should now have this:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0004.jpg) + +The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this +system):\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001_overview.jpg)\ +Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You +don\'t need to remove these, but you can if you want (to make it tidier +after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem +jack, the modem cable and also (on another model) a device inside the +part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn\'t sure what it was, but I knew +it wasn\'t needed). **This is optional** + +Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it +off with you hands). Already removed here:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001_microphone.jpg)\ +**Rationale:**\ +Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer +gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can record what you say, and use it +to receive data from nearby devices if they\'re compromised too. Also, +we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it +could theoretically be programmed to accept remote commands from some +speaker somewhere (remote security hole). **In other words, the system +could already be compromised from the factory.** + +Remove the modem:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001_modem.jpg)\ +(useless, obsolete device) + +Remove the speaker:\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001_speaker.jpg)\ +Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak +data.\ +If your computer gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can be used to +transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It\'s unknown if it can be +turned into a microphone[\[2\]](#ref2).\ +Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). + +Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):\ +![](../images/x60_security/0001_wlan_wwan.jpg)\ +Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could +(theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.\ +**Wifi:** The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They +might safe but could have access to the computer\'s RAM trough DMA. If +people have an intel card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default, +until you change it),then that card runs a non-free firwamre and has +access to the computer\'s RAM trough DMA! So the risk-level is very +high.\ +**Wwan (3g modem):** They run proprietary software! It\'s like AMT but +over the GSM network which is probably even worse.\ +Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, +this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not +recommended). + +Not covered yet: +---------------- + +- Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access) +- Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access) +- Disable flashing the ethernet firmware +- Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two + parts) +- Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA) +- Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in + coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option) + +Go to +<http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html> +or directly to the video: +<http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm>. + +A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second +half of the video to see how to do the above. + +Also not covered yet: +--------------------- + +- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws\ + Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, + take some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their + integrity. Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering + on the laptop. +- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. + - soldered RAM? + - seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that + system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail + polish) + - wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot + upstream?) + - ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots) +- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical + intrusions. +- For example: <http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/> or + <http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper>. +- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29> +- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Extra notes +=========== + +EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free +non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer\'s RAM. It has +access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some other +power management features. The issue is that it has access to the +keyboard, however if the software security howto **(not yet written)** +is followed correctly, it won\'t be able to leak data to a local +attacker. It has no network access but it may still be able to leak data +remotely, but that requires someone to be nearby to recover the data +with the help of an SDR and some directional antennas[\[3\]](#ref3). + +[Intel 82573 Ethernet +controller](http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller) on +the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. + +<div class="subsection"> + +Risk level +---------- + +- Modem (3g/wwan): highest +- Intel wifi: Near highest +- Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi. +- Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised. +- Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised. +- EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security. + +</div> + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Further reading material (software security) +============================================ + +- [Installing Debian or Devuan GNU+Linux with full disk encryption + (including /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_debian.html) +- [Installing Parabola GNU+Linux with full disk encryption (including + /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_parabola.html) +- [Notes about DMA access and the docking station](dock.html) + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +References +========== + +<div class="subsection"> + +\[1\] physical access {#ref1} +--------------------- + +Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, and +explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. Also +the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take the +probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of +target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000\$ +to 400000\$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that but +it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it makes it +more risky and more costly to attack people. + +</div> + +<div class="subsection"> + +\[2\] microphone {#ref2} +---------------- + +It\'s possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try +yourself, however they don\'t record loud at all. Also intel cards have +the capability to change a connector\'s function, for instance the +microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that\'s called +retasking. There is some support for it in GNU+Linux but it\'s not very +well known. + +</div> + +<div class="subsection"> + +\[3\] Video (CCC) {#ref3} +----------------- + +30c3-5356-en-Firmware\_Fat\_Camp\_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While +their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the +transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time. +<http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div class="section"> + +Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>\ +Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document +under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 +International license or any later version published by Creative +Commons; A copy of the license can be found at +[../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt](../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt) + +Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at +<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode> + +UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE EXTENT +POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS AND +AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND +CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY, +OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF TITLE, +MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, +ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE +OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF +WARRANTIES ARE NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT +APPLY TO YOU. + +TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU +ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, NEGLIGENCE) OR +OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, +PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES +ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN +IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, +COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT +ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. + +The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided above +shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent possible, most +closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and waiver of all liability. + +</div> |