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authorAlyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io>2017-03-17 22:24:25 -0700
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+<div class="section">
+
+Security on the ThinkPad X60
+============================
+
+Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This
+tutorial is **incomplete** at the time of writing.
+
+[Back to previous index](./)
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Table of Contents
+=================
+
+- [Hardware Requirements](#hardware_requirements)
+- [Software Requirements](#software_requirements)
+- [The procedure](#procedure)
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Hardware requirements {#hardware_requirements}
+=====================
+
+- An X60
+- screwdriver
+- (in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)
+
+Software requirements {#software_requirements}
+=====================
+
+- none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
+- You probably want to encrypt your GNU+Linux install using LUKS
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Rationale
+=========
+
+Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is
+important aswell.
+
+This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct
+memory access that could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be
+used to remotely command the system (or leak data). All of this is
+purely theoretical for the time being.
+
+Disassembly {#procedure}
+===========
+
+Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):\
+The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3
+locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):\
+![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth0.jpg)\
+Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth
+module is on the left (easily removable):\
+![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth.jpg)\
+
+If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):\
+Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard0.jpg)\
+SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard1.jpg)\
+Replacement: USB dongle.
+
+Now get into the motherboard.
+
+Remove those screws:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0000.jpg)
+
+Push the keyboard forward (carefully):\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001.jpg)
+
+Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0002.jpg)
+
+Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and
+pry up the rest of the chassis:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0003.jpg)
+
+You should now have this:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0004.jpg)
+
+The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this
+system):\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001_overview.jpg)\
+Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You
+don\'t need to remove these, but you can if you want (to make it tidier
+after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem
+jack, the modem cable and also (on another model) a device inside the
+part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn\'t sure what it was, but I knew
+it wasn\'t needed). **This is optional**
+
+Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it
+off with you hands). Already removed here:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001_microphone.jpg)\
+**Rationale:**\
+Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer
+gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can record what you say, and use it
+to receive data from nearby devices if they\'re compromised too. Also,
+we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it
+could theoretically be programmed to accept remote commands from some
+speaker somewhere (remote security hole). **In other words, the system
+could already be compromised from the factory.**
+
+Remove the modem:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001_modem.jpg)\
+(useless, obsolete device)
+
+Remove the speaker:\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001_speaker.jpg)\
+Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak
+data.\
+If your computer gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can be used to
+transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It\'s unknown if it can be
+turned into a microphone[\[2\]](#ref2).\
+Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB).
+
+Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):\
+![](../images/x60_security/0001_wlan_wwan.jpg)\
+Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could
+(theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.\
+**Wifi:** The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They
+might safe but could have access to the computer\'s RAM trough DMA. If
+people have an intel card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default,
+until you change it),then that card runs a non-free firwamre and has
+access to the computer\'s RAM trough DMA! So the risk-level is very
+high.\
+**Wwan (3g modem):** They run proprietary software! It\'s like AMT but
+over the GSM network which is probably even worse.\
+Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note,
+this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not
+recommended).
+
+Not covered yet:
+----------------
+
+- Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access)
+- Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access)
+- Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
+- Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two
+ parts)
+- Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
+- Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in
+ coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)
+
+Go to
+<http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html>
+or directly to the video:
+<http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm>.
+
+A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second
+half of the video to see how to do the above.
+
+Also not covered yet:
+---------------------
+
+- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws\
+ Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws,
+ take some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their
+ integrity. Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering
+ on the laptop.
+- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack.
+ - soldered RAM?
+ - seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that
+ system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail
+ polish)
+ - wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot
+ upstream?)
+ - ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
+- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical
+ intrusions.
+- For example: <http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/> or
+ <http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper>.
+- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29>
+- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3:
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Extra notes
+===========
+
+EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free
+non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer\'s RAM. It has
+access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some other
+power management features. The issue is that it has access to the
+keyboard, however if the software security howto **(not yet written)**
+is followed correctly, it won\'t be able to leak data to a local
+attacker. It has no network access but it may still be able to leak data
+remotely, but that requires someone to be nearby to recover the data
+with the help of an SDR and some directional antennas[\[3\]](#ref3).
+
+[Intel 82573 Ethernet
+controller](http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller) on
+the X60 seems safe, according to Denis.
+
+<div class="subsection">
+
+Risk level
+----------
+
+- Modem (3g/wwan): highest
+- Intel wifi: Near highest
+- Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
+- Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
+- Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
+- EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Further reading material (software security)
+============================================
+
+- [Installing Debian or Devuan GNU+Linux with full disk encryption
+ (including /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_debian.html)
+- [Installing Parabola GNU+Linux with full disk encryption (including
+ /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_parabola.html)
+- [Notes about DMA access and the docking station](dock.html)
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+References
+==========
+
+<div class="subsection">
+
+\[1\] physical access {#ref1}
+---------------------
+
+Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, and
+explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. Also
+the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take the
+probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of
+target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000\$
+to 400000\$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that but
+it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it makes it
+more risky and more costly to attack people.
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="subsection">
+
+\[2\] microphone {#ref2}
+----------------
+
+It\'s possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try
+yourself, however they don\'t record loud at all. Also intel cards have
+the capability to change a connector\'s function, for instance the
+microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that\'s called
+retasking. There is some support for it in GNU+Linux but it\'s not very
+well known.
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="subsection">
+
+\[3\] Video (CCC) {#ref3}
+-----------------
+
+30c3-5356-en-Firmware\_Fat\_Camp\_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While
+their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the
+transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time.
+<http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+
+Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe &lt;info@minifree.org&gt;\
+Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
+under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
+International license or any later version published by Creative
+Commons; A copy of the license can be found at
+[../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt](../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt)
+
+Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at
+<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>
+
+UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE EXTENT
+POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS AND
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+
+TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU
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+OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
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