+
+Use case:
+---------
+Usually when people do full disk encryption, it's not really full disk,
+instead they still have a /boot in clear.
+
+So an evil maid attack can still be done, in two passes:
+1) Clone the hdd, Infect the initramfs or the kernel.
+2) Wait for the user to enter its password, recover the password,
+luksOpen the hdd image.
+
+I wanted a real full-disk encryption so I've put grub in flash and I
+have the following: The HDD has a LUKS rootfs(containing /boot) on an
+lvm partition, so no partition is in clear.
+
+So when the computer boots it executes coreboot, then grub as a payload.
+Grub then opens the LUKS partition and loads the kernel and initramfs
+from there.
+
+To prevent hardware level tempering(like reflashing), I used nail
+polish with a lot of gilder, that acts like a seal. Then a high
+resolution picture of it is taken, to be able to tell the difference.
+
+The problem:
+------------
+But then comes the docking port issue: Some LPC pins are exported
+there, such as the CLKRUN and LDRQ#.
+
+LDRQ# is "Encoded DMA/Bus Master Request": "Only needed by
+peripherals that need DMA or bus mastering. Requires an
+individual signal per peripheral. Peripherals may not share
+an LDRQ# signal."
+
+So now DMA access is possible trough the dock connector.
+So I want to be able to turn that off.
+
+If I got it right, the X60 has 2 superio, one is in the dock, and the
+other one is in the laptop, so we have:
+                            ________________
+ _________________         |                |
+|                 |        | Dock connector:|
+|Dock: NSC pc87982|<--LPC--->D_LPC_DREQ0    |
+|_________________|        |_______^________|
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                ___________________|____
+               |                   v    |
+               | SuperIO:        DLDRQ# |
+               | NSC pc87382     LDRQ#  |
+               |___________________^____|
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                                   |
+                ___________________|___
+               |                   v   |
+               | Southbridge:    LDRQ0 |
+               | ICH7                  |
+               |_______________________|
+
+
+The code:
+---------
+Now if I look at the existing code, there is some superio drivers, like
+pc87382 in src/superio/nsc, the code is very small. 
+The only interesting part is the pnp_info pnp_dev_info struct.
+
+Now if I look inside src/mainboard/lenovo/x60 there is some more
+complete dock driver:
+
+Inside dock.c I see some dock_connect and dock_disconnect functions.
+
+Such functions are called during the initialisation (romstage.c) and
+from the X60 SMI handler (smihandler.c).
+
+Questions:
+----------
+1) Would the following be sufficent to prevent DMA access from the
+outside:
+> int dock_connect(void)
+> {
+>          int timeout = 1000;
+> +        int val;
+> +        
+> +        if (get_option(&val, "dock") != CB_SUCCESS)
+> +                val = 1;
+> +        if (val == 0)
+> +                return 0;
+>          [...]
+> }
+>
+> void dock_disconnect(void) {
+> +        if (dock_present())
+> +                return;
+>          [...]
+> }
+2) Would an nvram option be ok for that? Should a Kconfig option be
+added too?
+
+> config DOCK_AUTODETECT
+>         bool "Autodetect"
+>         help
+>           The dock is autodetected. If unsure select this option.
+>
+> config DOCK_DISABLED
+>         bool "Disabled"
+>         help
+>           The dock is always disabled.
+>
+> config DOCK_NVRAM_ENABLE
+>         bool "Nvram"
+>         help
+>           The dock autodetection is tried only if it is also enabled
+> trough nvram.
+
+

+ +

+ Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>
+ Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document + under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 + or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; + with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. + A copy of the license can be found at ../gfdl-1.3.txt +

+ +

+ Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at + https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html +

+ +

+ UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE + EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS + AND AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF + ANY KIND CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, + IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, + WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, + ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT + KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES ARE NOT + ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. +

+ TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE + TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, + NEGLIGENCE) OR OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, + INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, + COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR + USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN + ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR + DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR + IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. +

+ The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided + above shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent + possible, most closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and + waiver of all liability. +

+ +

Hardware maintenance

Hardwarei modifications

This section relates to hardware maintenance on supported targets.

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@

ThinkPad X60/X60s: How to change the LCD panel (incomplete. pics only for now)

ThinkPad T60 15.1" changing LCD panel

ThinkPad T60: change the fan/heatsink

ThinkPad X60/X60S: hardware security

ThinkPad T60: hardware security

Security on the ThinkPad T60

Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad T60. This tutorial is incomplete at the time of writing.

Back to previous index

Hardware Requirements
Software Requirements
The procedure

Hardware requirements

A T60
screwdriver
Rubbing or isopropyl alcohol, and thermal compound.
(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)

Software requirements

none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS

+ Rationale +

+ Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell. +

+ This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct memory access that + could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be used to remotely + command the system (or leak data). All of this is purely theoretical for the time being. +

+ +

Disassembly

+ +

+ Remove those screws and remove the HDD:
+ +

+ +

+ Lift off the palm rest:
+ +

+ +

+ Lift up the keyboard, pull it back a bit, flip it over like that and then disconnect it from the board:
+ +

+ +

+ Gently wedge both sides loose:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove that cable from the position:
+ +

+ +

+ Now remove that bezel. Remove wifi, nvram battery and speaker connector (also remove 56k modem, on the left of wifi):
+
+ Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.
+ Wifi: The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have + access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel + card(most T60 laptops come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs + a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So + the risk-level is very high. +

+ +

+ Remove those screws:
+ +

+ +

+ Disconnect the power jack:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove nvram battery (we will put it back later):
+ +

+ +

+ Disconnect cable (for 56k modem) and disconnect the other cable:
+ +

+ +

+ Disconnect speaker cable:
+ +

+ +

+ Disconnect the other end of the 56k modem cable:
+ +

+ +

+ Make sure you removed it:
+ +

+ +

+ Unscrew those:
+ +

+ +

+ Make sure you removed those:
+ +

+ +

+ Disconnect LCD cable from board:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove those screws then remove the LCD assembly:
+ +

+ +

+ Once again, make sure you removed those:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove the shielding containing the motherboard, then flip it over. Remove these screws, placing them on a steady + surface in the same layout as they were in before you removed them. Also, you should mark each screw hole after removing the + screw (a permanent marker pen will do), this is so that you have a point of reference when re-assembling the system:
+ + +

+ +

+ Remove microphone (soldering iron not needed. Just wedge it out gently):
+
+ Rationale:
+ Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can + record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if + they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically + be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). In other words, + the system could already be compromised from the factory. +

+ +

+ Remove infrared:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove cardbus (it's in a socket, no need to disable. Just remove the port itself):
+
+ Rationale:
+ It has direct memory access and can be used to extract sensitive details (such as LUKS keys). See + 'GoodBIOS' video linked at the end (speaker is Peter Stuge, a coreboot hacker). The video covers X60 + but the same topics apply to T60. +

+ +

+ Before re-installing the upper chassis, remove the speaker:
+
+ Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.
+ If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can be used to + transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be + turned into a microphone[2].
+ Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). +

+ +

+ Remove the wwan:
+
+ Wwan (3g modem): They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but over the GSM network which is + probably even worse.
+ Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended). +

+ +

+ This is where the simcard connector is soldered. See notes above about wwan. Remove simcard by removing battery + and then it's accessible (so, remember to do this when you re-assemble. or you could do it now?)
+ +

+ +

+ Put those screws back:
+ +

+ +

+ Put it back into lower chassis:
+ +

+ +

+ Attach LCD and insert screws (also, attach the lcd cable to the board):
+ +

+ +

+ Insert those screws:
+ +

+ +

+ On the CPU (and there is another chip south-east to it, sorry forgot to take pic) + clean off the old thermal paste (with the alcohol) and apply new (Artic Silver 5 is good, others are good too) + you should also clean the heatsink the same way
+ +

+ +

+ Attach the heatsink and install the screws (also, make sure to install the AC jack as highlighted):
+ +

+ +

+ Reinstall that upper bezel:
+ +

+ +

+ Do that:
+ +

+ +

+ Attach keyboard and install nvram battery:
+ +

+ +

+ Place keyboard and (sorry, forgot to take pics) reinstall the palmrest and insert screws on the underside:
+ +

+ +

+ Remove those covers and unscrew:
+ +

+ +

+ Gently pry off the front bezel (sorry, forgot to take pics). +

+ +

+ Remove bluetooth module:
+ +

+ +

+ Re-attach the front bezel and re-insert the screws (sorry, forgot to take pics). +

+ +

+ It lives!
+ +

+ +

+ Always stress test ('stress -c 2' and xsensors. below 90C is ok) when replacing cpu paste/heatsink:
+ +

+ +

+ Not covered yet: +

Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)
Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)

+ Go to http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html + or directly to the video: http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm. +

+ A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above. +

+ Also not covered yet: +

+ Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws
+ Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take + some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity. + Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop. +
+ Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. +
- soldered RAM?
- wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)
- ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
+
+ General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions. +
+ For example: http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ + or http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper. +
+ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29 +
+ https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: +

+ Extra notes +

+ EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free + non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM. + It has access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some + other power management features. The issue is that it has access to the + keyboard, however if the software security howto (not yet written) is followed correctly, + it won't be able to leak data to a local attacker. It has no network + access but it may still be able to leak data remotely, but that + requires someone to be nearby to recover the data with the help of an + SDR and some directional antennas[3]. +

+ Intel 82573 Ethernet controller + on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. +

+ +

+ Risk level +

Modem (3g/wwan): highest
Intel wifi: Near highest
Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.

+ Further reading material (software security) +

+ References +

[1] physical access

+ Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, + and explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. + Also the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take + the probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of + target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000$ + to 400000$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that + but it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it + makes it more risky and more costly to attack people. +

[2] microphone

+ It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try + yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have + the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the + microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called + retasking. There is some support for it in GNU/Linux but it's not very + well known. +

[3] Video (CCC)

+ 30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While + their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the + transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time. + http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm +

+ +

+ Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at + https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html +

+ +

Security on the ThinkPad X60

Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This tutorial is incomplete at the time of writing.

Back to previous index

Hardware Requirements
Software Requirements
The procedure

+ +

Hardware requirements

An X60
screwdriver
(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)

+ +

Software requirements

none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS

+ +

+ Rationale +

+ Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell. +

+ +

Disassembly

+ +

+ Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):
+ The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3 locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):
+
+ Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth module is on the left (easily removable):
+
+

+ +

+ If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):
+ Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:
+
+ SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:
+
+ Replacement: USB dongle. +

+ +

+ Now get into the motherboard. +

+ +

+ Remove those screws:
+ +

+ Push the keyboard forward (carefully):
+ +

+ Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:
+ +

+ Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and pry up the rest of the chassis:
+ +

+ You should now have this:
+ +

+ +

+ The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this system):
+
+ Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You don't need to remove these, but you can if you want + (to make it tidier after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem jack, the modem cable and + also (on another model) a device inside the part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn't sure what it was, but I knew it wasn't needed). This is optional +

+ +

+ Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it off with you hands). Already removed here:
+
+ Rationale:
+ Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can + record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if + they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically + be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). In other words, + the system could already be compromised from the factory. +

+ +

+ Remove the modem:
+
+ (useless, obsolete device) +

+ +

+ Remove the speaker:
+
+ Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.
+ If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can be used to + transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be + turned into a microphone[2].
+ Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). +

+ +

+ Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):
+
+ Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.
+ Wifi: The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have + access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel + card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs + a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So + the risk-level is very high.
+ Wwan (3g modem): They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but over the GSM network which is + probably even worse.
+ Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended). +

+ +

+ Not covered yet: +

Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access)
Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access)
Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)
Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)

+ A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above. +

+ +

+ Also not covered yet: +

+ Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws
+ Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take + some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity. + Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop. +
+ Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. +
- soldered RAM?
- seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail polish)
- wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)
- ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
+
+ General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions. +
+ For example: http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ + or http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper. +
+ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29 +
+ https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: +

+ +

+ Extra notes +

+ Intel 82573 Ethernet controller + on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. +

+ +

+ Risk level +

Modem (3g/wwan): highest
Intel wifi: Near highest
Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.

+ Further reading material (software security) +

+ References +

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)

+ +

+ Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at + https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html +

+ +

Other information

Notes about DMA and the docking station (X60/T60)

-
-Use case:
----------
-Usually when people do full disk encryption, it's not really full disk,
-instead they still have a /boot in clear.
-
-So an evil maid attack can still be done, in two passes:
-1) Clone the hdd, Infect the initramfs or the kernel.
-2) Wait for the user to enter its password, recover the password,
-luksOpen the hdd image.
-
-I wanted a real full-disk encryption so I've put grub in flash and I
-have the following: The HDD has a LUKS rootfs(containing /boot) on an
-lvm partition, so no partition is in clear.
-
-So when the computer boots it executes coreboot, then grub as a payload.
-Grub then opens the LUKS partition and loads the kernel and initramfs
-from there.
-
-To prevent hardware level tempering(like reflashing), I used nail
-polish with a lot of gilder, that acts like a seal. Then a high
-resolution picture of it is taken, to be able to tell the difference.
-
-The problem:
-------------
-But then comes the docking port issue: Some LPC pins are exported
-there, such as the CLKRUN and LDRQ#.
-
-LDRQ# is "Encoded DMA/Bus Master Request": "Only needed by
-peripherals that need DMA or bus mastering. Requires an
-individual signal per peripheral. Peripherals may not share
-an LDRQ# signal."
-
-So now DMA access is possible trough the dock connector.
-So I want to be able to turn that off.
-
-If I got it right, the X60 has 2 superio, one is in the dock, and the
-other one is in the laptop, so we have:
-                            ________________
- _________________         |                |
-|                 |        | Dock connector:|
-|Dock: NSC pc87982|<--LPC--->D_LPC_DREQ0    |
-|_________________|        |_______^________|
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                ___________________|____
-               |                   v    |
-               | SuperIO:        DLDRQ# |
-               | NSC pc87382     LDRQ#  |
-               |___________________^____|
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                                   |
-                ___________________|___
-               |                   v   |
-               | Southbridge:    LDRQ0 |
-               | ICH7                  |
-               |_______________________|
-
-
-The code:
----------
-Now if I look at the existing code, there is some superio drivers, like
-pc87382 in src/superio/nsc, the code is very small. 
-The only interesting part is the pnp_info pnp_dev_info struct.
-
-Now if I look inside src/mainboard/lenovo/x60 there is some more
-complete dock driver:
-
-Inside dock.c I see some dock_connect and dock_disconnect functions.
-
-Such functions are called during the initialisation (romstage.c) and
-from the X60 SMI handler (smihandler.c).
-
-Questions:
-----------
-1) Would the following be sufficent to prevent DMA access from the
-outside:
-> int dock_connect(void)
-> {
->          int timeout = 1000;
-> +        int val;
-> +        
-> +        if (get_option(&val, "dock") != CB_SUCCESS)
-> +                val = 1;
-> +        if (val == 0)
-> +                return 0;
->          [...]
-> }
->
-> void dock_disconnect(void) {
-> +        if (dock_present())
-> +                return;
->          [...]
-> }
-2) Would an nvram option be ok for that? Should a Kconfig option be
-added too?
-
-> config DOCK_AUTODETECT
->         bool "Autodetect"
->         help
->           The dock is autodetected. If unsure select this option.
->
-> config DOCK_DISABLED
->         bool "Disabled"
->         help
->           The dock is always disabled.
->
-> config DOCK_NVRAM_ENABLE
->         bool "Nvram"
->         help
->           The dock autodetection is tried only if it is also enabled
-> trough nvram.
-
-

- -

- Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>
- Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document - under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 - or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; - with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. - A copy of the license can be found at ../gfdl-1.3.txt -

- -

- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at - https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html -

- -

- UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE - EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS - AND AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF - ANY KIND CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, - IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, - WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, - ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT - KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES ARE NOT - ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. -

- TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE - TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, - NEGLIGENCE) OR OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, - INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, - COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR - USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN - ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR - DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR - IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. -

- The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided - above shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent - possible, most closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and - waiver of all liability. -

- -

Security topics

- Or Back to main index. -

- -

- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at - https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html -

- -

Security on the ThinkPad T60

Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad T60. This tutorial is incomplete at the time of writing.

Back to previous index

Hardware Requirements
Software Requirements
The procedure

Hardware requirements

A T60
screwdriver
Rubbing or isopropyl alcohol, and thermal compound.
(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)

Software requirements

none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS

- Rationale -

- Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell. -

- This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct memory access that - could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be used to remotely - command the system (or leak data). All of this is purely theoretical for the time being. -

- -

Disassembly

- -

- Remove those screws and remove the HDD:
- -

- -

- Lift off the palm rest:
- -

- -

- Lift up the keyboard, pull it back a bit, flip it over like that and then disconnect it from the board:
- -

- -

- Gently wedge both sides loose:
- -

- -

- Remove that cable from the position:
- -

- -

- Now remove that bezel. Remove wifi, nvram battery and speaker connector (also remove 56k modem, on the left of wifi):
-
- Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.
- Wifi: The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have - access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel - card(most T60 laptops come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs - a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So - the risk-level is very high. -

- -

- Remove those screws:
- -

- -

- Disconnect the power jack:
- -

- -

- Remove nvram battery (we will put it back later):
- -

- -

- Disconnect cable (for 56k modem) and disconnect the other cable:
- -

- -

- Disconnect speaker cable:
- -

- -

- Disconnect the other end of the 56k modem cable:
- -

- -

- Make sure you removed it:
- -

- -

- Unscrew those:
- -

- -

- Make sure you removed those:
- -

- -

- Disconnect LCD cable from board:
- -

- -

- Remove those screws then remove the LCD assembly:
- -

- -

- Once again, make sure you removed those:
- -

- -

- Remove the shielding containing the motherboard, then flip it over. Remove these screws, placing them on a steady - surface in the same layout as they were in before you removed them. Also, you should mark each screw hole after removing the - screw (a permanent marker pen will do), this is so that you have a point of reference when re-assembling the system:
- - -

- -

- Remove microphone (soldering iron not needed. Just wedge it out gently):
-
- Rationale:
- Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can - record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if - they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically - be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). In other words, - the system could already be compromised from the factory. -

- -

- Remove infrared:
- -

- -

- Remove cardbus (it's in a socket, no need to disable. Just remove the port itself):
-
- Rationale:
- It has direct memory access and can be used to extract sensitive details (such as LUKS keys). See - 'GoodBIOS' video linked at the end (speaker is Peter Stuge, a coreboot hacker). The video covers X60 - but the same topics apply to T60. -

- -

- Before re-installing the upper chassis, remove the speaker:
-
- Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.
- If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can be used to - transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be - turned into a microphone[2].
- Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). -

- -

- Remove the wwan:
-
- Wwan (3g modem): They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but over the GSM network which is - probably even worse.
- Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended). -

- -

- This is where the simcard connector is soldered. See notes above about wwan. Remove simcard by removing battery - and then it's accessible (so, remember to do this when you re-assemble. or you could do it now?)
- -

- -

- Put those screws back:
- -

- -

- Put it back into lower chassis:
- -

- -

- Attach LCD and insert screws (also, attach the lcd cable to the board):
- -

- -

- Insert those screws:
- -

- -

- On the CPU (and there is another chip south-east to it, sorry forgot to take pic) - clean off the old thermal paste (with the alcohol) and apply new (Artic Silver 5 is good, others are good too) - you should also clean the heatsink the same way
- -

- -

- Attach the heatsink and install the screws (also, make sure to install the AC jack as highlighted):
- -

- -

- Reinstall that upper bezel:
- -

- -

- Do that:
- -

- -

- Attach keyboard and install nvram battery:
- -

- -

- Place keyboard and (sorry, forgot to take pics) reinstall the palmrest and insert screws on the underside:
- -

- -

- Remove those covers and unscrew:
- -

- -

- Gently pry off the front bezel (sorry, forgot to take pics). -

- -

- Remove bluetooth module:
- -

- -

- Re-attach the front bezel and re-insert the screws (sorry, forgot to take pics). -

- -

- It lives!
- -

- -

- Always stress test ('stress -c 2' and xsensors. below 90C is ok) when replacing cpu paste/heatsink:
- -

- -

- Not covered yet: -

Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)
Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)

- Go to http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html - or directly to the video: http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm. -

- A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above. -

- Also not covered yet: -

- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws
- Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take - some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity. - Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop. -
- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. -
- soldered RAM?
- wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)
- ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
-
- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions. -
- For example: http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ - or http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper. -
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29 -
- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: -

- Extra notes -

- EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free - non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM. - It has access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some - other power management features. The issue is that it has access to the - keyboard, however if the software security howto (not yet written) is followed correctly, - it won't be able to leak data to a local attacker. It has no network - access but it may still be able to leak data remotely, but that - requires someone to be nearby to recover the data with the help of an - SDR and some directional antennas[3]. -

- Intel 82573 Ethernet controller - on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. -

- -

- Risk level -

Modem (3g/wwan): highest
Intel wifi: Near highest
Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.

- Further reading material (software security) -

- References -

[1] physical access

- Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, - and explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. - Also the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take - the probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of - target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000$ - to 400000$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that - but it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it - makes it more risky and more costly to attack people. -

[2] microphone

- It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try - yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have - the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the - microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called - retasking. There is some support for it in GNU/Linux but it's not very - well known. -

[3] Video (CCC)

- 30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While - their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the - transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time. - http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm -

- -

- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at - https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html -

- -

Security on the ThinkPad X60

Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This tutorial is incomplete at the time of writing.

Back to previous index

Hardware Requirements
Software Requirements
The procedure

- -

Hardware requirements

An X60
screwdriver
(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)

- -

Software requirements

none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS

- -

- Rationale -

- Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell. -

- -

Disassembly

- -

- Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):
- The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3 locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):
-
- Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth module is on the left (easily removable):
-
-

- -

- If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):
- Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:
-
- SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:
-
- Replacement: USB dongle. -

- -

- Now get into the motherboard. -

- -

- Remove those screws:
- -

- Push the keyboard forward (carefully):
- -

- Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:
- -

- Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and pry up the rest of the chassis:
- -

- You should now have this:
- -

- -

- The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this system):
-
- Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You don't need to remove these, but you can if you want - (to make it tidier after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem jack, the modem cable and - also (on another model) a device inside the part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn't sure what it was, but I knew it wasn't needed). This is optional -

- -

- Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it off with you hands). Already removed here:
-
- Rationale:
- Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can - record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if - they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically - be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). In other words, - the system could already be compromised from the factory. -

- -

- Remove the modem:
-
- (useless, obsolete device) -

- -

- Remove the speaker:
-
- Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.
- If your computer gets[1] compromised, it can be used to - transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be - turned into a microphone[2].
- Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). -

- -

- Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):
-
- Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.
- Wifi: The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have - access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel - card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs - a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So - the risk-level is very high.
- Wwan (3g modem): They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but over the GSM network which is - probably even worse.
- Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended). -

- -

- Not covered yet: -

Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access)
Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access)
Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)
Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)

- A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above. -

- -

- Also not covered yet: -

- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws
- Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take - some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity. - Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop. -
- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. -
- soldered RAM?
- seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail polish)
- wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)
- ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
-
- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions. -
- For example: http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ - or http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper. -
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29 -
- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: -

- -

- Extra notes -

- Intel 82573 Ethernet controller - on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. -

- -

- Risk level -

Modem (3g/wwan): highest
Intel wifi: Near highest
Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.

- Further reading material (software security) -

- References -

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)

- -

- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at - https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html -

- -

Notes about DMA and the docking station (X60/T60)

Hardware maintenance

Hardwarei modifications

Security on the ThinkPad T60

Table of Contents

Hardware requirements

Software requirements

+ Rationale +

Disassembly

+ Not covered yet: +

+ Also not covered yet: +

+ Extra notes +

+ Risk level +

+ Further reading material (software security) +

+ References +

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)

Security on the ThinkPad X60

Table of Contents

Hardware requirements

Software requirements

+ Rationale +

Disassembly

+ Not covered yet: +

+ Also not covered yet: +

+ Extra notes +

+ Risk level +

+ Further reading material (software security) +

+ References +

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)

Other information

Notes about DMA and the docking station (X60/T60)

Security topics

Security on the ThinkPad T60

Table of Contents

Hardware requirements

Software requirements

- Rationale -

Disassembly

- Not covered yet: -

- Also not covered yet: -

- Extra notes -

- Risk level -

- Further reading material (software security) -

- References -

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)

Security on the ThinkPad X60

Table of Contents

Hardware requirements

Software requirements

- Rationale -

Disassembly

- Not covered yet: -

- Also not covered yet: -

- Extra notes -

- Risk level -

- Further reading material (software security) -

- References -

[1] physical access

[2] microphone

[3] Video (CCC)