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| author | Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org> | 2017-04-04 23:28:53 +0000 |
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| committer | Gogs <gogitservice@gmail.com> | 2017-04-04 23:28:53 +0000 |
| commit | 2a8d4222cc1a4d2f4ea068da00b7204cde3883d0 (patch) | |
| tree | a1e6290c5b6e7f09bd43d91718f532b5529d4533 /docs/hardware/t60_security.md | |
| parent | 60af3bd694ce24e15e38263a6a0ad4e6f313ec78 (diff) | |
| parent | 15ee46bb2995319f2866089b7cf50f467ab223b7 (diff) | |
| download | librebootfr-2a8d4222cc1a4d2f4ea068da00b7204cde3883d0.tar.gz librebootfr-2a8d4222cc1a4d2f4ea068da00b7204cde3883d0.zip | |
Merge branch 'leahleah' of libreboot/libreboot into master
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diff --git a/docs/hardware/t60_security.md b/docs/hardware/t60_security.md deleted file mode 100644 index d4d66ca4..00000000 --- a/docs/hardware/t60_security.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,362 +0,0 @@ -% Security on the ThinkPad T60 - -Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad T60. This -tutorial is **incomplete** at the time of writing. - -[Back to previous index](./) - -Table of Contents -================= - -- [Hardware Requirements](#hardware_requirements) -- [Software Requirements](#software_requirements) -- [The procedure](#procedure) - -Hardware requirements {#hardware_requirements} -===================== - -- A T60 -- screwdriver -- Rubbing or isopropyl alcohol, and thermal compound. -- (in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel) - -Software requirements {#software_requirements} -===================== - -- none (at least in the scope of the article as-is) -- You probably want to encrypt your GNU+Linux install using LUKS - -Rationale -========= - -Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is -important aswell. - -This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct -memory access that could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be -used to remotely command the system (or leak data). All of this is -purely theoretical for the time being. - -Disassembly {#procedure} -=========== - -Remove those screws and remove the HDD:\ -  - -Lift off the palm rest:\ - - -Lift up the keyboard, pull it back a bit, flip it over like that and -then disconnect it from the board:\ -  - - -Gently wedge both sides loose:\ -  - -Remove that cable from the position:\ -  - -Now remove that bezel. Remove wifi, nvram battery and speaker connector -(also remove 56k modem, on the left of wifi):\ -\ -Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could -(theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.\ -**Wifi:** The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They -might safe but could have access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If -people have an intel card(most T60 laptops come with Intel wifi by -default, until you change it),then that card runs a non-free firwamre -and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So the risk-level is -very high. - -Remove those screws:\ - - -Disconnect the power jack:\ - - -Remove nvram battery (we will put it back later):\ - - -Disconnect cable (for 56k modem) and disconnect the other cable:\ -  - -Disconnect speaker cable:\ - - -Disconnect the other end of the 56k modem cable:\ - - -Make sure you removed it:\ - - -Unscrew those:\ - - -Make sure you removed those:\ - - -Disconnect LCD cable from board:\ - - -Remove those screws then remove the LCD assembly:\ -  - - -Once again, make sure you removed those:\ - - -Remove the shielding containing the motherboard, then flip it over. -Remove these screws, placing them on a steady surface in the same layout -as they were in before you removed them. Also, you should mark each -screw hole after removing the screw (a permanent marker pen will do), -this is so that you have a point of reference when re-assembling the -system:\ -  -  -  - -Remove microphone (soldering iron not needed. Just wedge it out -gently):\ -\ -**Rationale:**\ -Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer -gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can record what you say, and use it -to receive data from nearby devices if they're compromised too. Also, -we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it -could theoretically be programmed to accept remote commands from some -speaker somewhere (remote security hole). **In other words, the system -could already be compromised from the factory.** - -Remove infrared:\ -  - -Remove cardbus (it's in a socket, no need to disable. Just remove the -port itself):\ -\ -**Rationale:**\ -It has direct memory access and can be used to extract sensitive details -(such as LUKS keys). See 'GoodBIOS' video linked at the end (speaker -is Peter Stuge, a coreboot hacker). The video covers X60 but the same -topics apply to T60. - -Before re-installing the upper chassis, remove the speaker:\ - \ -Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak -data.\ -If your computer gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can be used to -transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be -turned into a microphone[\[2\]](#ref2).\ -Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB). - -Remove the wwan:\ -\ -**Wwan (3g modem):** They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but -over the GSM network which is probably even worse.\ -Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, -this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not -recommended). - -This is where the simcard connector is soldered. See notes above about -wwan. Remove simcard by removing battery and then it's accessible (so, -remember to do this when you re-assemble. or you could do it now?)\ - - -Put those screws back:\ - - -Put it back into lower chassis:\ - - -Attach LCD and insert screws (also, attach the lcd cable to the board):\ - - -Insert those screws:\ - - -On the CPU (and there is another chip south-east to it, sorry forgot to -take pic) clean off the old thermal paste (with the alcohol) and apply -new (Artic Silver 5 is good, others are good too) you should also clean -the heatsink the same way\ - - -Attach the heatsink and install the screws (also, make sure to install -the AC jack as highlighted):\ - - -Reinstall that upper bezel:\ - - -Do that:\ -  - -Attach keyboard and install nvram battery:\ -  - -Place keyboard and (sorry, forgot to take pics) reinstall the palmrest -and insert screws on the underside:\ - - -Remove those covers and unscrew:\ -  - - -Gently pry off the front bezel (sorry, forgot to take pics). - -Remove bluetooth module:\ -  - -Re-attach the front bezel and re-insert the screws (sorry, forgot to -take pics). - -It lives!\ -  - - -Always stress test ('stress -c 2' and xsensors. below 90C is ok) when -replacing cpu paste/heatsink:\ - - -Not covered yet: ----------------- - -- Disable flashing the ethernet firmware -- Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two - parts) - -- Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA) -- Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in - coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option) - -Go to -<http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html> -or directly to the video: -<http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm>. - -A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second -half of the video to see how to do the above. - -Also not covered yet: ---------------------- - -- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws - - Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, - take some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their - integrity. Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering - on the laptop. -- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack. - - soldered RAM? - - wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot - upstream?) - - ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots) -- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical - intrusions. -- For example: <http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/> or - <http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper>. -- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29> -- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3: - -Extra notes -=========== - -EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free -non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM. It has -access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some other -power management features. The issue is that it has access to the -keyboard, however if the software security howto **(not yet written)** -is followed correctly, it won't be able to leak data to a local -attacker. It has no network access but it may still be able to leak data -remotely, but that requires someone to be nearby to recover the data -with the help of an SDR and some directional antennas[\[3\]](#ref3). - -[Intel 82573 Ethernet -controller](http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller) on -the X60 seems safe, according to Denis. - -Risk level ----------- - -- Modem (3g/wwan): highest -- Intel wifi: Near highest -- Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi. -- Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised. -- Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised. -- EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security. - -Further reading material (software security) -============================================ - -- [Installing Debian or Devuan GNU+Linux with full disk encryption - (including /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_debian.html) -- [Installing Parabola GNU+Linux with full disk encryption (including - /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_parabola.html) -- [Notes about DMA access and the docking station](dock.html) - -References -========== - -\[1\] physical access {#ref1} ---------------------- - -Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, and -explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. Also -the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take the -probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of -target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000\$ -to 400000\$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that but -it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it makes it -more risky and more costly to attack people. - -\[2\] microphone {#ref2} ----------------- - -It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try -yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have -the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the -microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called -retasking. There is some support for it in GNU+Linux but it's not very -well known. - -\[3\] Video (CCC) {#ref3} ------------------ - -30c3-5356-en-Firmware\_Fat\_Camp\_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While -their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the -transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time. -<http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm> - -Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>\ -Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document -under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 -International license or any later version published by Creative -Commons; A copy of the license can be found at -[../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt](../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt) - -Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at -<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode> - -UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE EXTENT -POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS AND -AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND -CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY, -OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF TITLE, -MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, -ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE -OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF -WARRANTIES ARE NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT -APPLY TO YOU. - -TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU -ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, NEGLIGENCE) OR -OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, -PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES -ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN -IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, -COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT -ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. - -The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided above -shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent possible, most -closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and waiver of all liability. - |