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-% Security on the ThinkPad X60
-
-Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This
-tutorial is **incomplete** at the time of writing.
-
-[Back to previous index](./)
-
-Table of Contents
-=================
-
--   [Hardware Requirements](#hardware_requirements)
--   [Software Requirements](#software_requirements)
--   [The procedure](#procedure)
-
-Hardware requirements {#hardware_requirements}
-=====================
-
--   An X60
--   screwdriver
--   (in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)
-
-Software requirements {#software_requirements}
-=====================
-
--   none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)
--   You probably want to encrypt your GNU+Linux install using LUKS
-
-Rationale
-=========
-
-Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is
-important aswell.
-
-This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct
-memory access that could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be
-used to remotely command the system (or leak data). All of this is
-purely theoretical for the time being.
-
-Disassembly {#procedure}
-===========
-
-Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):\
-The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3
-locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):\
-![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth0.jpg)\
-Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth
-module is on the left (easily removable):\
-![](../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth.jpg)\
-
-If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):\
-Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard0.jpg)\
-SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0000_simcard1.jpg)\
-Replacement: USB dongle.
-
-Now get into the motherboard.
-
-Remove those screws:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0000.jpg)
-
-Push the keyboard forward (carefully):\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001.jpg)
-
-Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0002.jpg)
-
-Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and
-pry up the rest of the chassis:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0003.jpg)
-
-You should now have this:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0004.jpg)
-
-The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this
-system):\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001_overview.jpg)\
-Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You
-don't need to remove these, but you can if you want (to make it tidier
-after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem
-jack, the modem cable and also (on another model) a device inside the
-part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn't sure what it was, but I knew
-it wasn't needed). **This is optional**
-
-Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it
-off with you hands). Already removed here:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001_microphone.jpg)\
-**Rationale:**\
-Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer
-gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can record what you say, and use it
-to receive data from nearby devices if they're compromised too. Also,
-we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it
-could theoretically be programmed to accept remote commands from some
-speaker somewhere (remote security hole). **In other words, the system
-could already be compromised from the factory.**
-
-Remove the modem:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001_modem.jpg)\
-(useless, obsolete device)
-
-Remove the speaker:\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001_speaker.jpg)\
-Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak
-data.\
-If your computer gets[\[1\]](#ref1) compromised, it can be used to
-transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be
-turned into a microphone[\[2\]](#ref2).\
-Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB).
-
-Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):\
-![](../images/x60_security/0001_wlan_wwan.jpg)\
-Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could
-(theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.\
-**Wifi:** The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They
-might safe but could have access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If
-people have an intel card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default,
-until you change it),then that card runs a non-free firwamre and has
-access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So the risk-level is very
-high.\
-**Wwan (3g modem):** They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but
-over the GSM network which is probably even worse.\
-Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note,
-this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not
-recommended).
-
-Not covered yet:
-----------------
-
--   Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access)
--   Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access)
--   Disable flashing the ethernet firmware
--   Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two
-    parts)
-
--   Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)
--   Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in
-    coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)
-
-Go to
-<http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html>
-or directly to the video:
-<http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm>.
-
-A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second
-half of the video to see how to do the above.
-
-Also not covered yet:
----------------------
-
--   Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws
-
-    Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws,
-    take some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their
-    integrity. Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering
-    on the laptop.
--   Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack.
-    -   soldered RAM?
-    -   seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that
-        system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail
-        polish)
-    -   wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot
-        upstream?)
-    -   ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)
--   General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical
-    intrusions.
--   For example: <http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/> or
-    <http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper>.
--   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29>
--   https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3:
-
-Extra notes
-===========
-
-EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free
-non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM. It has
-access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some other
-power management features. The issue is that it has access to the
-keyboard, however if the software security howto **(not yet written)**
-is followed correctly, it won't be able to leak data to a local
-attacker. It has no network access but it may still be able to leak data
-remotely, but that requires someone to be nearby to recover the data
-with the help of an SDR and some directional antennas[\[3\]](#ref3).
-
-[Intel 82573 Ethernet
-controller](http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller) on
-the X60 seems safe, according to Denis.
-
-Risk level
-----------
-
--   Modem (3g/wwan): highest
--   Intel wifi: Near highest
--   Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.
--   Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
--   Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.
--   EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.
-
-Further reading material (software security)
-============================================
-
--   [Installing Debian or Devuan GNU+Linux with full disk encryption
-    (including /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_debian.html)
--   [Installing Parabola GNU+Linux with full disk encryption (including
-    /boot)](../gnulinux/encrypted_parabola.html)
--   [Notes about DMA access and the docking station](dock.html)
-
-References
-==========
-
-\[1\] physical access {#ref1}
----------------------
-
-Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in, and
-explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do. Also
-the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take the
-probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of
-target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000\$
-to 400000\$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that but
-it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it makes it
-more risky and more costly to attack people.
-
-\[2\] microphone {#ref2}
-----------------
-
-It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try
-yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have
-the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the
-microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called
-retasking. There is some support for it in GNU+Linux but it's not very
-well known.
-
-\[3\] Video (CCC) {#ref3}
------------------
-
-30c3-5356-en-Firmware\_Fat\_Camp\_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While
-their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the
-transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time.
-<http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm>
-
-Copyright © 2014, 2015 Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>\
-This page is available under the [CC BY SA 4.0](../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt)