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authorFrancis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk>2015-11-06 22:43:29 +0000
committerFrancis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk>2015-11-07 04:45:09 +0000
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-<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
-<head>
- <meta charset="utf-8">
- <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-
- <style type="text/css">
- @import url('../css/main.css');
- </style>
-
- <title>Libreboot documentation: Security on the ThinkPad X60</title>
-</head>
-
-<body>
-
- <div class="section">
- <h1>Security on the ThinkPad X60</h1>
- <p>Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad X60. This tutorial is <b>incomplete</b> at the time of writing.</p>
- <p><a href="index.html">Back to previous index</a></p>
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
- <h1>Table of Contents</h1>
- <ul>
- <li><a href="#hardware_requirements">Hardware Requirements</a></li>
- <li><a href="#software_requirements">Software Requirements</a></li>
- <li><a href="#procedure">The procedure</a></li>
- </ul>
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
-
- <h1 id="hardware_requirements">Hardware requirements</h1>
- <ul>
- <li>An X60</li>
- <li>screwdriver</li>
- <li>(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)</li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1 id="software_requirements">Software requirements</h1>
- <ul>
- <li>none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)</li>
- <li>You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS</li>
- </ul>
-
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
-
- <h1>
- Rationale
- </h1>
- <p>
- Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell.
- </p>
- <p>
- This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct memory access that
- could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be used to remotely
- command the system (or leak data). All of this is purely theoretical for the time being.
- </p>
-
- <h1 id="procedure">Disassembly</h1>
-
- <p>
- Firstly remove the bluetooth (if your X60 has this):<br/>
- The marked screws are underneath those stickers (marked in those 3 locations at the bottom of the LCD assembly):<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth0.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- Now gently pry off the bottom part of the front bezel, and the bluetooth module is on the left (easily removable):<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0000_bluetooth.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- If your model was WWAN, remove the simcard (check anyway):<br/>
- Uncover those 2 screws at the bottom:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0000_simcard0.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- SIM card (not present in the picture) is in the marked location:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0000_simcard1.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- Replacement: USB dongle.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Now get into the motherboard.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove those screws:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0000.jpg" alt="" />
- </p>
- <p>
- Push the keyboard forward (carefully):<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001.jpg" alt="" />
- </p>
- <p>
- Lift the keyboard up and disconnect it from the board:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0002.jpg" alt="" />
- </p>
- <p>
- Grab the right-hand side of the chassis and force it off (gently) and pry up the rest of the chassis:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0003.jpg" alt="" />
- </p>
- <p>
- You should now have this:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0004.jpg" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- The following is a summary of what you will remove (already done to this system):<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001_overview.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- Note: the blue lines represent antenna cables and modem cables. You don't need to remove these, but you can if you want
- (to make it tidier after removing other parts). I removed the antenna wires, the modem jack, the modem cable and
- also (on another model) a device inside the part where the wwan antenna goes (wasn't sure what it was, but I knew it wasn't needed). <b>This is optional</b>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the microphone (can desolder it, but you can also easily pull it off with you hands). Already removed here:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001_microphone.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- <b>Rationale:</b><br/>
- Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can
- record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if
- they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically
- be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). <b>In other words,
- the system could already be compromised from the factory.</b>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the modem:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001_modem.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- (useless, obsolete device)
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the speaker:<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001_speaker.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.<br/>
- If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can be used to
- transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be
- turned into a microphone<a href="#ref2">[2]</a>.<br/>
- Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB).
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the wlan (also remove wwan if you have it):<br/>
- <img src="../images/x60_security/0001_wlan_wwan.jpg" alt="" /><br/>
- Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.<br/>
- <b>Wifi:</b> The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have
- access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel
- card(most X60s come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs
- a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So
- the risk-level is very high.<br/>
- <b>Wwan (3g modem):</b> They run proprietary software! It's like AMT but over the GSM network which is
- probably even worse.<br/>
- Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended).
- </p>
-
- <h2>
- Not covered yet:
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>Disable cardbus (has fast/direct memory access)</li>
- <li>Disable firewire (has fast/direct memory access)</li>
- <li>Disable flashing the ethernet firmware</li>
- <li>Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)</li>
- <li>Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)</li>
- <li>Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)</li>
- </ul>
- <p>
- Go to <a href="http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html">http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html</a>
- or directly to the video: <a href="http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm">http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm</a>.
- </p>
- <p>
- A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above.
- </p>
-
- <h2>
- Also not covered yet:
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>
- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws<br/>
- Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take
- some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity.
- Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop.
- </li>
- <li>
- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack.
- <ul>
- <li>soldered RAM?</li>
- <li>seal RAM door shut (possibly modified lower chassis) so that system has to be disassembled (which has to go through the nail polish)</li>
- <li>wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)</li>
- <li>ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)</li>
- </ul>
- </li>
- <li>
- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions.
- </li>
- <li>
- For example: <a href="http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/">http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/</a>
- or <a href="http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper">http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/content/how-leak-sensitive-data-isolated-computer-air-gap-near-mobile-phone-airhopper</a>.
- </li>
- <li>
- <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29</a>
- </li>
- <li>
- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3:
- </li>
- </ul>
-
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
- <h1>
- Extra notes
- </h1>
- <p>
- EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free
- non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM.
- It has access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some
- other power management features. The issue is that it has access to the
- keyboard, however if the software security howto <b>(not yet written)</b> is followed correctly,
- it won't be able to leak data to a local attacker. It has no network
- access but it may still be able to leak data remotely, but that
- requires someone to be nearby to recover the data with the help of an
- SDR and some directional antennas<a href="#ref3">[3]</a>.
- </p>
- <p>
- <a href="http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller">Intel 82573 Ethernet controller</a>
- on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis.
- </p>
-
- <div class="subsection">
- <h2>
- Risk level
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>Modem (3g/wwan): highest</li>
- <li>Intel wifi: Near highest</li>
- <li>Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.</li>
- <li>Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
- <li>Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
- <li>EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.</li>
- </ul>
- </div>
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
- <h1>
- Further reading material (software security)
- </h1>
- <ul>
- <li><a href="../gnulinux/encrypted_trisquel.html">Installing Trisquel GNU/Linux with full disk encryption (including /boot)</a></li>
- <li><a href="../gnulinux/encrypted_parabola.html">Installing Parabola GNU/Linux with full disk encryption (including /boot)</a></li>
- <li><a href="dock.html">Notes about DMA access and the docking station</a></li>
- </ul>
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
- <h1>
- References
- </h1>
- <div class="subsection">
- <h2 id="ref1">[1] physical access</h2>
- <p>
- Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in,
- and explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do.
- Also the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take
- the probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of
- target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000$
- to 400000$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that
- but it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it
- makes it more risky and more costly to attack people.
- </p>
- </div>
- <div class="subsection">
- <h2 id="ref2">[2] microphone</h2>
- <p>
- It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try
- yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have
- the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the
- microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called
- retasking. There is some support for it in GNU/Linux but it's not very
- well known.
- </p>
- </div>
- <div class="subsection">
- <h2 id="ref3">[3] Video (CCC)</h2>
- <p>
- 30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While
- their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the
- transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time.
- <a href="http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm">http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm</a>
- </p>
- </div>
- </div>
-
- <div class="section">
-
- <p>
- Copyright &copy; 2014, 2015 Francis Rowe &lt;info@gluglug.org.uk&gt;<br/>
- Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
- under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3
- or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation;
- with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts.
- A copy of the license can be found at <a href="../gfdl-1.3.txt">../gfdl-1.3.txt</a>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at
- <a href="https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html">https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html</a>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE
- EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS
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- TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE
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