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| author | Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org> | 2017-03-07 05:18:28 +0000 |
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| committer | Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org> | 2017-03-07 05:18:28 +0000 |
| commit | d05afc608200090ea0c3ab9d17cacdb42cc7e5ff (patch) | |
| tree | 88e5881c5f9e4774e93c1d22cfa054d51d4e98f0 | |
| parent | 0be85f82c2ffe56859701c9ada615bfa846d0879 (diff) | |
| download | librebootfr-d05afc608200090ea0c3ab9d17cacdb42cc7e5ff.tar.gz librebootfr-d05afc608200090ea0c3ab9d17cacdb42cc7e5ff.zip | |
add missing grub_hardening.html file from repo (mentioning GPG instead of PGP)
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html | 268 |
1 files changed, 268 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html b/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c9e187d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + + <style type="text/css"> + @import url('../css/main.css'); + </style> + + <title>GRUB secure boot with GPG</title> +</head> + +<body> + <div class="section"> + <h1> + GRUB secure boot with GPG + </h1> + + <p> + This uses the free implementation of the GPG standard for encryption + and signing/verifying data. We will be using this for checking the signature + of a Linux kernel at boot time. + More information about GPG can be found on the + <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/gnupg/">GPG project website</a>. + GRUB has some GPG support built in, for checking signatures. + </p> + + <p> + This tutorial assumes you have a libreboot image (rom) that you wish to modify, + to which we shall henceforth refer to as "my.rom". + This tutorial modifies grubtest.cfg, this means signing and password protection + will work after switching to it in the main boot menu and bricking due to + incorrect configuration will be impossible. + After you are satisfied with the setup, you should transfer the new settings + to grub.cfg to make your machine actually secure. + </p> + + <p> + First extract the old grubtest.cfg and remove it from the libreboot image: +<pre> +cbfstool my.rom extract -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg +cbfstool my.rom remove -n grubtest.cfg +</pre> + </p> + <p> + Helpful links: + <ul> + <li><a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/html_node/Security.html#Security"> + GRUB manual #security</a></li> + <li><a href="http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/tree/docs/grub.texi"> + GRUB info pages</a></li> + <li><a href="https://libreboot.org/faq/#firmware-hddssd"> + SATA connected storage considered dangerous until proven otherwise.</a></li> + <li><a href="https://www.coreboot.org/GRUB2#Security"> + Coreboot GRUB security howto</a></li> + </ul> + </p> + </div> + <div class="section"> + <h1> + GRUB Password + </h1> + <p> + The security of this setup depends on a good GRUB password as GPG signature + checking can be disabled through the interactive console: + </p> + <pre>set check_signatures=no</pre> + <p> + This is good in that it allows you to occasionally boot unsigned liveCDs and such. + You may think of supplying signatures on an usb key, but the signature + checking code currently looks for </path/to/filename>.sig when verifying + </path/to/filename> and as such it is not possible to supply signatures + in an alternate location. + </p> + <p> + Note that this is not your LUKS password, but it's a password that you have to + enter in order to use "restricted" functionality (such as console). This + protects your system from an attacker simply booting a live USB and re-flashing + your firmware. + <b>This should be different than your LUKS passphrase and user password.</b> + </p> +<!-- + Use of the <i>diceware method</i> is recommended, for generating secure passphrases (as opposed to passwords). + WTF is a diceware method?! + <p style="font-size:2em;"> + MAKE SURE TO DO THIS ON grubtest.cfg *BEFORE* DOING IT ON grub.cfg. + Then select the menu entry that says <i>Switch to grubtest.cfg</i> and test that it works. + Then copy that to grub.cfg once you're satisfied. + WHY? BECAUSE AN INCORRECTLY SET PASSWORD CONFIG MEANS YOU CAN'T AUTHENTICATE, WHICH MEANS 'BRICK'. + </p> + <p> + (emphasis added, because it's needed. This is a common roadblock for users) + </p> +--> + <p> + The GRUB password can be entered in two ways: + <ul> + <li>plaintext</li> + <li>protected with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pbkdf2">PBKDF2</a></li> + </ul> + We will (obviously) use the later. Generating the PBKDF2 derived key is done + using the <b>grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2</b> utility. You can get it by installing + GRUB version 2. Generate a key by giving it a password: + </p> + <pre>grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2</pre> + <p> + Its output will be a string of the following form: + grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.HEXDIGITS.MOREHEXDIGITS + </p> + <p> + Now open my.grubtest.cfg and put the following before the menu entries (prefered + above the functions and after other directives). Of course use the pbdkf string + that you had generated yourself: + </p> + <pre> +set superusers="root" +password_pbkdf2 root grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.711F186347156BC105CD83A2ED7AF1EB971AA2B1EB2640172F34B0DEFFC97E654AF48E5F0C3B7622502B76458DA494270CC0EA6504411D676E6752FD1651E749.8DD11178EB8D1F633308FD8FCC64D0B243F949B9B99CCEADE2ECA11657A757D22025986B0FA116F1D5191E0A22677674C994EDBFADE62240E9D161688266A711</pre> + <p> + Obviously, replace it with the correct hash that you actually got for the password + that you entered. Meaning, not the hash that you see above! + </p> + <p> + As enabling password protection as above means that you have to input it on + every single boot, we will make one menu entry work without it. Remember that + we will have GPG signing active, thus a potential attacker will not be able + to boot an arbitrary operating system. We do this by adding option + <b>--unrestricted</b> to a menuentry definition: + </p> + <pre>menuentry 'Load Operating System (incl. fully encrypted disks) [o]' --hotkey='o' --unrestricted { +...</pre> + <p> + Another good thing to do, if we chose to load signed on-disk GRUB configurations, + is to remove (or comment out) <b>unset superusers</b> in function try_user_config: + </p> + <pre> +function try_user_config { + set root="${1}" + for dir in boot grub grub2 boot/grub boot/grub2; do + for name in '' autoboot_ libreboot_ coreboot_; do + if [ -f /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg ]; then + #unset superusers + configfile /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg + fi + done + done +}</pre> + <p> + Why? We allowed booting normally without entering a password above. + When we unset superusers and then load a signed GRUB configuration file, + we can easily use the command line as password protection will be completely + disabled. Disabling signature checking and booting whatever an attacker wants + is then just a few GRUB commands away. + </p> + + <p> + As far as basic password setup is concerned we are done and we can now move on to signing. + </p> + </div> + <div class="section"> + <h1> + GPG keys + </h1> + <p> + First generate a GPG keypair to use for signing. Option RSA (sign only) is ok. + </p> + <p> + <b>Warning:</b> GRUB does not read ASCII armored keys. + When attempting to trust ... a key filename it will print error: bad signature + </p> + <pre> +mkdir --mode 0700 keys +gpg --homedir keys --gen-key +gpg --homedir keys --export-secret-keys --armor > boot.secret.key # backup +gpg --homedir keys --export > boot.key</pre> + + <p> + Now that we have a key, we can sign some files with it. We have to sign: + <ul> + <li>a kernel</li> + <li>(if we have one) an initramfs</li> + <li>(if we wish to transfer control to it) an on-disk grub.cfg</li> + <li>grubtest.cfg (this is so one can go back to grubtest.cfg after signature + checking is enforced. You can always get back to grub.cfg by pressing ESC, + but afterwards grubtest.cfg is not signed and it will not load.</li> + </ul> + + Suppose that we have a pair of <b>my.kernel</b> and <b>my.initramfs</b> + and an on-disk <b>libreboot_grub.cfg</b>. We sign them by issuing the + following commands: + </p> +<pre> +gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.initramfs +gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.kernel +gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign libreboot_grub.cfg +gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.grubtest.cfg +</pre> + <p> + Of course some further modifications to my.grubtest.cfg will be required. + We have to trust the key and enable signature enforcement + (put this before menu entries): + </p> +<pre> +trust (cbfsdisk)/boot.key +set check_signatures=enforce +</pre> + <p> + What remains now is to include the modifications into the image (rom): + </p> +<pre> +cbfstool my.rom add -n boot.key -f boot.key -t raw +cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg -t raw +cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg.sig -f my.grubtest.cfg.sig -t raw +</pre> + <p> + ... and flashing it. + </p> + </div> + + <div class="section"> + + <p> + Copyright © 2017 Fedja Beader <fedja@protonmail.ch><br/> + Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document + under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license + or any later version published by Creative Commons; + + A copy of the license can be found at <a href="../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt">../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt</a> + </p> + + <p> + Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at + <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode</a> + </p> + + <p> + UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE + EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS + AND AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF + ANY KIND CONCERNING THE LICENSED MATERIAL, WHETHER EXPRESS, + IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHER. THIS INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, + WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER DEFECTS, + ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT + KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE. WHERE DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES ARE NOT + ALLOWED IN FULL OR IN PART, THIS DISCLAIMER MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. + </p> + <p> + TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE + TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, + NEGLIGENCE) OR OTHERWISE FOR ANY DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, + INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR OTHER LOSSES, + COSTS, EXPENSES, OR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS PUBLIC LICENSE OR + USE OF THE LICENSED MATERIAL, EVEN IF THE LICENSOR HAS BEEN + ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, OR + DAMAGES. WHERE A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IS NOT ALLOWED IN FULL OR + IN PART, THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. + </p> + <p> + The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided + above shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent + possible, most closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and + waiver of all liability. + </p> + </div> + +</body> +</html> |