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+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+
+ <style type="text/css">
+ @import url('../css/main.css');
+ </style>
+
+ <title>GRUB secure boot with GPG</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+ <div class="section">
+ <h1>
+ GRUB secure boot with GPG
+ </h1>
+
+ <p>
+ This uses the free implementation of the GPG standard for encryption
+ and signing/verifying data. We will be using this for checking the signature
+ of a Linux kernel at boot time.
+ More information about GPG can be found on the
+ <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/gnupg/">GPG project website</a>.
+ GRUB has some GPG support built in, for checking signatures.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ This tutorial assumes you have a libreboot image (rom) that you wish to modify,
+ to which we shall henceforth refer to as "my.rom".
+ This tutorial modifies grubtest.cfg, this means signing and password protection
+ will work after switching to it in the main boot menu and bricking due to
+ incorrect configuration will be impossible.
+ After you are satisfied with the setup, you should transfer the new settings
+ to grub.cfg to make your machine actually secure.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ First extract the old grubtest.cfg and remove it from the libreboot image:
+<pre>
+cbfstool my.rom extract -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg
+cbfstool my.rom remove -n grubtest.cfg
+</pre>
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Helpful links:
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/html_node/Security.html#Security">
+ GRUB manual #security</a></li>
+ <li><a href="http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/tree/docs/grub.texi">
+ GRUB info pages</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://libreboot.org/faq/#firmware-hddssd">
+ SATA connected storage considered dangerous until proven otherwise.</a></li>
+ <li><a href="https://www.coreboot.org/GRUB2#Security">
+ Coreboot GRUB security howto</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </p>
+ </div>
+ <div class="section">
+ <h1>
+ GRUB Password
+ </h1>
+ <p>
+ The security of this setup depends on a good GRUB password as GPG signature
+ checking can be disabled through the interactive console:
+ </p>
+ <pre>set check_signatures=no</pre>
+ <p>
+ This is good in that it allows you to occasionally boot unsigned liveCDs and such.
+ You may think of supplying signatures on an usb key, but the signature
+ checking code currently looks for &lt;/path/to/filename&gt;.sig when verifying
+ &lt;/path/to/filename&gt; and as such it is not possible to supply signatures
+ in an alternate location.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Note that this is not your LUKS password, but it's a password that you have to
+ enter in order to use "restricted" functionality (such as console). This
+ protects your system from an attacker simply booting a live USB and re-flashing
+ your firmware.
+ <b>This should be different than your LUKS passphrase and user password.</b>
+ </p>
+<!--
+ Use of the <i>diceware method</i> is recommended, for generating secure passphrases (as opposed to passwords).
+ WTF is a diceware method?!
+ <p style="font-size:2em;">
+ MAKE SURE TO DO THIS ON grubtest.cfg *BEFORE* DOING IT ON grub.cfg.
+ Then select the menu entry that says <i>Switch to grubtest.cfg</i> and test that it works.
+ Then copy that to grub.cfg once you're satisfied.
+ WHY? BECAUSE AN INCORRECTLY SET PASSWORD CONFIG MEANS YOU CAN'T AUTHENTICATE, WHICH MEANS 'BRICK'.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ (emphasis added, because it's needed. This is a common roadblock for users)
+ </p>
+-->
+ <p>
+ The GRUB password can be entered in two ways:
+ <ul>
+ <li>plaintext</li>
+ <li>protected with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pbkdf2">PBKDF2</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ We will (obviously) use the later. Generating the PBKDF2 derived key is done
+ using the <b>grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2</b> utility. You can get it by installing
+ GRUB version 2. Generate a key by giving it a password:
+ </p>
+ <pre>grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2</pre>
+ <p>
+ Its output will be a string of the following form:
+ grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.HEXDIGITS.MOREHEXDIGITS
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Now open my.grubtest.cfg and put the following before the menu entries (prefered
+ above the functions and after other directives). Of course use the pbdkf string
+ that you had generated yourself:
+ </p>
+ <pre>
+set superusers=&quot;root&quot;
+password_pbkdf2 root grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.711F186347156BC105CD83A2ED7AF1EB971AA2B1EB2640172F34B0DEFFC97E654AF48E5F0C3B7622502B76458DA494270CC0EA6504411D676E6752FD1651E749.8DD11178EB8D1F633308FD8FCC64D0B243F949B9B99CCEADE2ECA11657A757D22025986B0FA116F1D5191E0A22677674C994EDBFADE62240E9D161688266A711</pre>
+ <p>
+ Obviously, replace it with the correct hash that you actually got for the password
+ that you entered. Meaning, not the hash that you see above!
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ As enabling password protection as above means that you have to input it on
+ every single boot, we will make one menu entry work without it. Remember that
+ we will have GPG signing active, thus a potential attacker will not be able
+ to boot an arbitrary operating system. We do this by adding option
+ <b>--unrestricted</b> to a menuentry definition:
+ </p>
+ <pre>menuentry 'Load Operating System (incl. fully encrypted disks) [o]' --hotkey='o' --unrestricted {
+...</pre>
+ <p>
+ Another good thing to do, if we chose to load signed on-disk GRUB configurations,
+ is to remove (or comment out) <b>unset superusers</b> in function try_user_config:
+ </p>
+ <pre>
+function try_user_config {
+ set root="${1}"
+ for dir in boot grub grub2 boot/grub boot/grub2; do
+ for name in '' autoboot_ libreboot_ coreboot_; do
+ if [ -f /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg ]; then
+ #unset superusers
+ configfile /"${dir}"/"${name}"grub.cfg
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+}</pre>
+ <p>
+ Why? We allowed booting normally without entering a password above.
+ When we unset superusers and then load a signed GRUB configuration file,
+ we can easily use the command line as password protection will be completely
+ disabled. Disabling signature checking and booting whatever an attacker wants
+ is then just a few GRUB commands away.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ As far as basic password setup is concerned we are done and we can now move on to signing.
+ </p>
+ </div>
+ <div class="section">
+ <h1>
+ GPG keys
+ </h1>
+ <p>
+ First generate a GPG keypair to use for signing. Option RSA (sign only) is ok.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ <b>Warning:</b> GRUB does not read ASCII armored keys.
+ When attempting to trust ... a key filename it will print error: bad signature
+ </p>
+ <pre>
+mkdir --mode 0700 keys
+gpg --homedir keys --gen-key
+gpg --homedir keys --export-secret-keys --armor > boot.secret.key # backup
+gpg --homedir keys --export > boot.key</pre>
+
+ <p>
+ Now that we have a key, we can sign some files with it. We have to sign:
+ <ul>
+ <li>a kernel</li>
+ <li>(if we have one) an initramfs</li>
+ <li>(if we wish to transfer control to it) an on-disk grub.cfg</li>
+ <li>grubtest.cfg (this is so one can go back to grubtest.cfg after signature
+ checking is enforced. You can always get back to grub.cfg by pressing ESC,
+ but afterwards grubtest.cfg is not signed and it will not load.</li>
+ </ul>
+
+ Suppose that we have a pair of <b>my.kernel</b> and <b>my.initramfs</b>
+ and an on-disk <b>libreboot_grub.cfg</b>. We sign them by issuing the
+ following commands:
+ </p>
+<pre>
+gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.initramfs
+gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.kernel
+gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign libreboot_grub.cfg
+gpg --homedir keys --detach-sign my.grubtest.cfg
+</pre>
+ <p>
+ Of course some further modifications to my.grubtest.cfg will be required.
+ We have to trust the key and enable signature enforcement
+ (put this before menu entries):
+ </p>
+<pre>
+trust (cbfsdisk)/boot.key
+set check_signatures=enforce
+</pre>
+ <p>
+ What remains now is to include the modifications into the image (rom):
+ </p>
+<pre>
+cbfstool my.rom add -n boot.key -f boot.key -t raw
+cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg -f my.grubtest.cfg -t raw
+cbfstool my.rom add -n grubtest.cfg.sig -f my.grubtest.cfg.sig -t raw
+</pre>
+ <p>
+ ... and flashing it.
+ </p>
+ </div>
+
+ <div class="section">
+
+ <p>
+ Copyright &copy; 2017 Fedja Beader &lt;fedja@protonmail.ch&gt;<br/>
+ Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
+ under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license
+ or any later version published by Creative Commons;
+
+ A copy of the license can be found at <a href="../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt">../cc-by-sa-4.0.txt</a>
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Updated versions of the license (when available) can be found at
+ <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode</a>
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ UNLESS OTHERWISE SEPARATELY UNDERTAKEN BY THE LICENSOR, TO THE
+ EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE LICENSOR OFFERS THE LICENSED MATERIAL AS-IS
+ AND AS-AVAILABLE, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF
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+ <p>
+ TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN NO EVENT WILL THE LICENSOR BE LIABLE
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